Bormann's authenticity: Debunking common myths



INTRODUCTION

There are many myths and unsubstantiated rumors that leak into National Socialist circles to discredit the NSDAP as an illegitimate worldview. Such rumors vary from Hitler being Jewish, Hitler being a Rothschild agent, the NSDAP being funded by Capitalism, Joseph Goebbels being Jewish or his diary being fake, Alfred Rosenberg being Jewish, etc. Much of which is usually an attack on character rather than policy/ideas.

One myth in particular that goes unchecked within modern day National Socialist circles is the idea that Martin Bormann was a secret spy for the soviet union. One may laugh at why this article is being written since the consensus amongst historians already establish that Bormann was not a spy. This article will establish Martin Bormann as an authentic entity within the NSDAP.

WAS MARTIN BORMANN A SPY?

Short answer: No. It should be noted that rumors about Martin Bormann were not limited to Gehlen. Many newspapers and authors at the time also claimed he escaped to South America, most notably “Nazi Hunter” Simon Wiesenthal. **[1]** Others claimed that Bormann was killed by a tank trying to flee **[2]** or even that Bormann was inside of a tank.**[3]** Interestingly all of these claims have also been applied to Hitler as well which would suggest that the mystery of Bormann’s death being speculated about is not something to be surprised of.

Bormann Killed Trying to Flee, Say Witnesses

Hitler Henchman Was Decapitated By Exploding Tank

FRANKFURT, Jan. 3 (Reuters) — Martin Bormann is dead and the manhunt for Hitler's former deputy and signatory to the Nazi leader's suicide pact is ended, British reports indicated last night.

The last mystery of the dying days of Hitler's toppled Reich was cleared up by evidence that Bormann was decapitated when a Nazi tank — behind which the deputy was fleeing Berlin—exploded.

Evidence of two unidentified witnesses to this effect was reported by British intelligence officers who examined their affidavits. British officials stated the witnesses, now in custody, did not know each other, but their stories checked in every detail.

NOT BORMANN

The Associated Press said last night in a dispatch from Ploen, Germany, that British intelligence officers had denied that any person suspected of being Bormann is under arrest in that district. Rumors had said a man named Marius, arrested in Neumuenster in Schleswig - Holstein province, had been identified as Bormann.

From the witnesses' stories, the last hours of Hitler and his henchmen in the air raid shelter of Berlin's reichchancellory have been reconstructed.

Thirty persons assembled in the shelter, took oaths to write a glorious page to Nazi history by meeting death at the fuehrer's side, the witnesses said.

CHANGED HIS MIND

Shortly afterward, Bormann apparently decided that he preferred a humble place among the living to a more exalted place among the Nazi elite dead. The witnesses said Bormann and a number of the company decided to escape the bunker as soon as Hitler and his newly - wed bride, Eva Braun, had been cremated on a backyard funeral pyre.

They attempted their breakaway behind massed tanks.

Bormann was riding directly behind one tank when Soviet gunfire straddled it. Then a direct hit pulverized the tank and shreds of steel slashed off Bormann's head, the witnesses recounted.

All of the related claims could not have been conclusively proven, and Reinhard Gehlen, who later became the first president of the German Federal Intelligence Service, was no exception. Along with the spy idea being popularized within his memoirs, Gehlen wrote that Bormann was suspected of having a radio unit that was not monitored, which

facilitated communication with the Soviets:

“[Martin Bormann] possessed the only radio unit not monitored. We were in agreement, however, that a targeted attempt to monitor the most powerful man inside the National Socialist hierarchy apart from Hitler was practically ruled out at that time. [...] Two reliable informants gave me the certainty in the 1950s that Martin Bormann was living inside the Soviet Union perfectly hidden.” **[4]**

Gehlen assumed the former based on a “long conversation” that concluded the Soviets were getting information from a foreign entity which possibly originated from the higher ups within the party. Gehlen again suspiciously could not provide evidence for the latter. Reinhard Gehlen's attempt to provide information about Martin Bormann's whereabouts came under scrutiny during an inquiry led by an investigating judge, Horst von Glasenapp. Gehlen claimed that one of his contacts had observed Bormann in a weekly newsreel shown in an East Berlin cinema, suggesting that he was living in the Soviet Union "under perfect cover" after the war. However, when pressed for further details, Gehlen's substantiation of this claim appeared to be lacking. He was not willing to make a sworn statement regarding the accuracy of the information, which significantly undermined its credibility:

"Horst von Glasenapp, a Frankfurt investigating judge who is still hoping to track Bormann down, immediately asked Gehlen to record his secret information on the Nazi leader [Martin Bormann], and the Federal government gave Gehlen permission to make a statement. In 1946 or 1947, Gehlen said, orie of his contact men had seen the weekly newsreel in an East Berlin cinema; it included a sporting event in Moscow and during the film the camera had swung along the mass of spectators in the stadium. Gehlen’s man had detected Bormann among the crowd. This was all Gehlen’s statement to Glasenapp amounted to. Moreover, he was not prepared to make the statement (which ran to four foolscap pages) on oath." **[5]**

The editors of Die Welt, who had purchased the rights to serialize Gehlen's memoirs, sought more concrete evidence to support his surprising assertion about Bormann, but were then met with a cold refusal from Gehlen himself, indicating that he did not have the necessary proof to substantiate the idea of Bormann being a spy:

"the editors of die welt (who had paid 450,000 marks for the serial rights) asked urgently for further facts to support this somewhat surprising theory about bormann; they met with a cold refusal from the memoir-writer on lake starnberg. die welt had no alternative but to issue editorials playing down gehlen’s version

of bormann's whereabouts—'"conclusive proof is lacking"—"too many questions about bormann remain unanswered'—"innumerable hot trails" **[6]**

As shown, Reinhard Gelhen's claim could not have been substantiated even by his own evidence and thus what he has to say on Bormann's whereabouts after the war is unreliable. You would expect as someone that had to do with German intelligence would provide a shred of reliable evidence to the table. At worst he was not told accurate information, at best he is intentionally lying. The evidence may suggest the latter. Martin Bormann's brother Albert Bormann under denazification had also assumed Martin Bormann was still living in the soviet union. **[7]** Even SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger claimed Bormann was an agent who absconded to moscow. Though admittedly not a confirmed accusation, Berger claimed that the assertions will ***"be confirmed in the course of the next years."*** **[8]** Yet, despite limited access to Soviet archives after the Cold War and eventual complete access after it, no evidence has been found to suggest Bormann communicated with the Soviets or acted as their agent. A spy of his stature would have left behind some trace of collaboration, yet none exists. This would further classify these assertions as rumors rather than substantiated claims. Since no one who claims Bormann to be a spy had ever testified to directly witnessing his alleged traitorous acts.

Even people who were contemporaries of the Third Reich also doubt and prove this rumor otherwise. German military officer Otto Skorzeny had strong doubts on this unproven claim in his memoirs:

"In 1971 Reinhard Gchlen published a book of recollections under the title Der Dienst. There one reads that the mysterious informant working for the Red Orchestra spy net was none other than…Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, the head of the party chancellery. This thesis is practically insupportable. Bormann didn't have the means to learn of Hitler's military decisions fast enough and pass them on to Rössler so quickly. [...] The BND has now admitted that Bormann is no longer among the living. I was aware of this fact and repeated it every time I was interrogated by the allies. I always considered him to be one of the most sinister people in Hitler's entourage, peace to his ashes. I just ask myself why Reinhard Gehlen claimed that Bormann was the "conductor" in the OKW?" **[9]**

Subsequently, the national leader of the Hitler Youth Artur Axmann too had spoken a great deal about this spy claim in his memoirs. He had also concluded there is zero evidence for this. His testimony as a source is valid since he went on the run with Martin Bormann from Hitler's bunker. Axmann highlighted his own argument against the claim with his own testimony that Bormann had specifically refused to negotiate with the

Soviet Union even if it meant it could potentially save Goebbels and himself from death:

"My most important argument against the treason theory is the following incident, which I experienced myself and can therefore testify to. After the announcement of Adolf Hitler's political testament, in which Dr. Goebbels was appointed Reich Chancellor and Bormann Party Minister, a meeting was held in the storeroom under the leadership of the new Reich Chancellor. Bormann, Chief of the General Staff Krebs, General Burgdorf, State Secretary Naumann and I took part. The discussion focused on establishing contact with the Soviets with the aim of achieving an armistice. Goebbels commissioned General Krebs with this mission. Goebbels then asked Bormann: "As Party Minister, do you want to go with General Krebs as a parliamentarian to the Soviet commander?" Bormann refused with a clear "No". So Chief of the General Staff Krebs went without Bormann to the Soviet General Chuikov, who had his quarters in the Schulenburgstrasse in Tempelhof. Now I ask myself why Bormann didn't go with us if he was supposed to be an agent of Stalin? He was given the unique opportunity to return to his employers under the protection of the white flag of truce. But nothing of the sort happened. Instead, Bormann decided to risk breaking out of Berlin with us. Each of us knew that it was a suicide mission and that there was little chance of getting through the Soviet lines alive. Is this how an agent behaves, who would rather risk his life to report to the head of state in northern Germany, even though he could have defected to the Soviets without any danger? I say no. And Bormann was well aware of the life-threatening risk he was taking by breaking out. At least that's what he said in our circle and to his secretary." **[10]**

Artur Axmann makes a strong argument. If Bormann was a spy, why didn't he simply ditch the rest of what's left of the party and go to the soviet union and surrender? Why did he go on a suicide mission trying to escape the soviet union? Axmann had also noted Gerhard Klopfer and Werner Naumann, who were significantly closer to Bormann than he was, had also called the spy claims absurd:

"I would like to cite various facts from my own experience to counter the version of General Gehlen and all those who share his view. In my discussions with Bormann, I always found that for him Hitler's word and decision were law. Even when he personally had a different opinion on a matter, which was rare enough, he consistently insisted on implementing Hitler's decision. In this sense, he was loyal to his boss. Based on this experience, I find it hard to believe that Bormann sold out and betrayed his boss to the Soviets. After the war, I spoke at length with State Secretary Dr. Klopfer in the Nuremberg-Langwasser concentration camp. He

was Bormann's right-hand man for cooperation with the state agencies. Despite all his criticism of his boss's human behavior, he was of the opinion that the idea of his boss betraying Hitler was completely absurd. I also expressed this belief to the State Secretary in the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Naumann. Here, too, we are dealing with two personalities who are even closer than when I worked with Bormann." **[11]**

So if we were to take the fallacious route like the spreaders of the soviet spy myth and evaluate the testimonies based on authority/personal witness, Reinhard Gehlen's authority is further broken by Bormann's closest associates that had testified to never seen any traitorous activities even if Bormann's attitude/personality was harsh to fellow party members.

So where and how did Martin Bormann die? All of the available evidence suggests that Martin Bormann likely died on May 2, 1945, during the final days of World War II. It is believed that he and his aide, Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger, committed suicide by ingesting cyanide. This conclusion is based on the examination of skeletal remains found in Berlin, which were confirmed to be Bormann's through dental records. The remains were discovered several years after the war, and the forensic investigation indicated that Bormann bit down on a poison vial, leading to his death. The final report suggested that he died between 1:30 and 2:30 PM on that day. **[12]** Artur Axmann had also personally seen the dead body of Martin Bormann while on the run—something which no other testimony could've positively claimed. Which would further confirm what we already know. **[13]**

Counter Arguments have been presented in the past. Though of course not up to date with the latest information or remained inconclusive. Louis Kilzer in his book "Hitler's Traitor: Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich" list's Bormann's possible motive for betraying Hitler was for his admiration for Stalin and Socialism, albeit self defeating as within the same passage he says Hitler too had admired Stalin and Socialism. then writes it off on ***"If Hitler's shadow [i.e Martin Bormann] had the same aim, it would not matter much who actually won the war--the racist socialist Stalin or the racist socialist Hitler."*** **[14]** In context, Kilzer writes that Bormann was involved with Heinrich Müller in the funkspiel operation to deceive the soviets.Yet, an analysis of the files related to Heinrich Müller in the national archives show that the CIA investigated and concluded there wasn't any conclusive evidence that Heinrich Müller was working with the soviets, despite Müller having allegedly admiring Stalin. **[15]** Likewise with Bormann's situation, it was also claimed that Heinrich Müller was safe in the soviet union after the war. Walter Schellenberg stated in his memoirs that he was told by a German officer who was imprisoned in the USSR that he personally saw Heinrich Müller

in 1948. **[16]** The issue with this claim is that Schellenberg could not name the German officer that told him that information, so the claim cannot be verified, and how no evidence had ever surfaced even after the collapse of the USSR that Müller ever was in the Soviet Union, let alone evidence that he was still alive past the year 1945. These are the same exact issues found in Reinhard Gehlen's claims against Bormann, and thus cannot be taken seriously without any sort of substantiation. Perhaps this is the reason why Louis Kilzer wasn't able to provide any footnotes for such a strong empirical claim that Bormann was ***"betraying the Third Reich"*** via Heinrich Müller.

Another point shown in the book is the fact that Martin Bormann deployed Heinrich Heim to note down Hitler's utterances.**[17]** Kilzer tried to imply a connection that Bormann wanting to know Hitler's thoughts during meetings or at the table while he was not there is suspicious or somehow worth bringing up. Why else would it be mentioned? This would be rather ineffective to prove Bormann as a spy, as Kilzer also writes that Heim omitted any mentioning of military plans in his notes. So obviously Bormann's intentions were not malicious against Hitler at all. As Heim was not ordered specifically to take notes about important military plans, but Hitler's utterances in general like things about Jews, religion, doctrines, etc. Kilzer then mentions that Werner Koeppen did note military plans, however. But then again, Koeppen had nothing to do with Bormann. He was making notes presumably for Alfred Rosenberg, since he was his representative at the FHQ. So what does bringing that up prove? Nothing. Since neither Heim or Koeppen's notes were ever used to relay secrets to the allies and had been underground sources for some time until it finally resurfaced, neither of those examples prove any type of malicious intent going on due to having zero connection to the soviets.

So why was Martin Bormann and Werner Koeppen collecting notes based on what Hitler uttered during his table talks? The most accepted likely explanation (or at least according to Mikael Nilsson) for why Martin Bormann was collecting notes of Hitler's conversations is that he aimed to preserve Hitler's words for political purposes within the party's bureaucracy. Bormann sought to control the intellectual-political development of the NSDAP by creating a compendium of Hitler's views on important matters or on matters he thought was interesting. **[18]** Bormann would also turn what Hitler's words that were said during these table talks into official policy. Koeppen also wished to preserve Hitler's utterances for seemingly archival purposes. All of this seems to be rather consistent with Bormann's character for reasons that will be explained a little later. Therefore, Bormann's extended note taking job has nothing to do with the implications that Louis Kilzer talks about in his poorly cited book. In fact, Bormann is seemingly known for making memorandums on important matters including Hitler's utterances even before Heim/Picker was commissioned to take notes. Even when

looking at archival sources we can see many times before 1941 of Bormann making memorandums relating to Hitler. **[19]** Other sources apart from Bormann himself that affirms this can also be found in Hans Frank's diary in 1944 in which he wrote:


Der Führer sagte dann gegen Schluß, daß er alles tun werde, um mir zu helfen. Meine Aufgabe sei eine wichtige. Er vergewisserte sich dann auch noch, ob Reichsleiter Bormann alles aufgezeichnet habe, was aus der Besprechung festzuhalten sei. Im übrigen gab er mir anheim, mich künftig vertrauensvoll an ihn zu wenden.

"The Führer then said towards the end that he would do everything he could to help me. My job is an important one. He then also made sure that Reichsleiter Bormann had recorded everything that needed to be recorded from the meeting. He also told me to trust him in the future." **[20]**

As shown, what Bormann is doing isn't necessarily unusual for him. Especially that Hitler likely knew Bormann or someone else was recording his thoughts in private apart from regular military matters. All things considered zero evidence to this day can conclusively prove Martin Bormann to be a spy. All of the evidence in hand would actually prove the opposite. Every single rumor on him being a spy can be considered dubious in nature and not worth engaging. The evidence points to Bormann being fanatically loyal to Hitler and the party's aims.

One of Hitler's private secretaries Christa Schroeder had stated in her memoirs on the incorruptible character that Bormann had:

"Many of the rumours still current about Bormann have in my opinion no basis in fact. He was neither hungry for power nor the 'grey eminence' in Hitler's entourage. To my mind he was one of the few National Socialists with clean hands, if one may put it that way, for he was incorruptible and came down hard on all corruption he discovered. For his oppressive attitude in this regard he increasingly antagonised corrupt Party members and many others. [...] 'I know that Bormann is brutal,' Hitler said once, 'but whatever he takes on is given hands and feet, and I can rely on him absolutely and unconditionally to carry out my orders immediately and irrespective of whatever obstructions may be in the way.' For Hitler, Martin Bormann was a better and more acceptable colleague than Rudolf Hess had been, and of whom Hitler once said: 'I only hope that he never

becomes my successor, for I do not know whom I would pity more, Hess or the Party.'" **[21]**

WAS MARTIN BORMANN AN ATHEIST?

A common indictment against his character was that he was an atheist. Yet no one who spreads this myth is able to back it up with his own statements on the idea of a higher power. So really this is purely an assumption on the basis that he was not a Christian. However, Martin Bormann himself said that he did not understand God like the "naïve Christians" which would imply he did believe in God, simply not the Christian interpretation of it. In a 1941 memorandum on the relationship of National Socialism to Christianity, Bormann said:

"The force which moves all these bodies in the universe, in accordance with natural law, is what we call the Almighty or God. The assertion that this world-force can worry about the fate of every individual, every bacillus on earth, and that it can be influenced by so-called prayer or other astonishing things, is based either on a suitable dose of naiveté or on outright commercial effrontery. In contrast, we National Socialists demand that we live as naturally as possible, i.e. in accordance with the laws of life. The more closely we recognize and observe the laws of nature and life, the more we adhere to them, the more we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more we understand and follow the will of the Almighty, the greater our successes will be." **[22]**

What he says in the memorandum can be confirmed as his genuine thoughts when we look at his private writings. In February 1944, he wrote a letter to Gerda:



Wer sich nun als Geschöpf dieses Lebens eingebettet weiß in dieses Leben, anders ausgedrückt: in den Willen des Höchsten, der Allmacht, der Natur d.h. in den Willen Gottes, wer sich lediglich als eine von unzähligen Maschen des Gewebes, das wir Volk nennen, fühlt, dem können die Härten dieses Daseins gar nicht schrecken. Dem gehts tatsächlich nach dem alten Kirchenlied "Es kann mir nichts geschehen ....." Wir sind eingesponnen und es kann gar nicht anders sein, in den ewigen Kreislauf alles Lebens d.h. in den Kreislauf der Natur.

Das solltest Du bedenken und Du solltest Dir Dein Leben nicht gänzlich unnötig mit völlig törichten Schreckgespenstern und Ängsten erschweren.

Mit Deiner vorzeitigen Angst vor Fliegerangriffen kommst Du mir wie ein Backfisch vor, dem schon im Alter von zehn Jahren vor den Wehen beim Kinderkriegen graust!

Warte es doch erst einmal ab! Klugkeit und Einsicht sollten Dich veranlassen, Dir nicht immer gräßliche Zukunftsmöglichkeiten auszumalen, sondern statt dessen selbstsichere und auf jeden Fall wirklichkeitsnahe!

Uff! Beinahe machst Du mich zu einem Prediger! Bessere Dich, denn Du fühlst es selbst -- dieses Kleid steht mir nicht!

Herzlichst Dein ger. M.

"Anyone who feels himself to be a creature of this life and encompassed by this life, in other words, by the will of All-Highest, of Omnipotence, of Nature, that is to say, by the will of God,—anyone who feels himself to be merely one of the countless meshes of the web we call a people—cannot be frightened by the hardships of this existence." **[23]**

Martin Bormann strongly correlated Nature's laws as something omnipotent through the will of God. This would definitively show that Bormann had a conception of a higher power. In another letter to Frau Gerda on September 1st, 1944, Bormann had explicitly denied that he was Godless and blamed the Christians for losing faith in Germany:



MARTIN BORMANN 3 277

MÜNCHEN 33, DEN FÜHRERBAU 1/9/44

[illegible] dunkeln Wolken wieder einen freundlicheren Himmel sähst. Gegenwärtig sieht es ja arg aus und viel Ausweg sieht man nimmer! Aber wenns zu dunkeln beginnt sieht man auch noch nicht den Morgen [illegible] der kommt doch u. wenn man in die Kurve fährt, sieht man auch nicht, wie der Weg weitergehen soll! Daß der Spruch "wenn die Not am größten, ist Gottes Hülfe am nächsten" zum Sprichwort würde, zeigt, wie oft es solche Notzeit im Menschenleben gibt! Aber ich will nicht schulmeistern. Nur noch

"... I am the luckiest fellow there is on this earth. On the one hand I am allowed to serve the Führer in closest proximity, on the other hand I have got you! [...] The fact that the saying 'When the need is greatest, God's help is nearest' has become a proverb shows how frequently such times of need occur in human existence. But I don't want to lecture like a schoolmaster. Only one thing more in this connection: we—who are called godless and unbelievers by our reactionary adversaries—we believe in the Führer, we believe that we master Destiny by doing our duty, devotedly, loyally and unshaken in our faith. And the others Witzleben, Gördeler and accomplices are the unbelievers, the Christians are those weak in faith, those who despair!" **[24]**

WAS BORMANN LOYAL TO HITLER?

In efforts to establish Martin Bormann's authenticity, we need to also establish his role and his importance to the NSDAP. Bormann was a very significant and powerful figure that is often referred to as 'Hitler's shadow' because he was with him at all times and had direct access to him. Since the spy accusation has been refuted, this can now serve as a 'food for thought' in understanding who and what Bormann was.

Martin Bormann was a highly significant figure in the National Socialist regime, serving as one of Hitler's closest confidants and ultimately becoming one of the most powerful individuals in Germany. His influence grew notably during the latter part of the regime, particularly after the flight of Rudolf Heß to Scotland in May 1941, which allowed Bormann to rise past rivals to become the chief of the Party Chancellery and essentially the executor of Hitler's orders. **[25]**

Bormann's significant rise in power from Hitler is demonstrated in the following decree from Adolf Hitler himself below. Hess's 'Deputy Führer' office was completely replaced and ran by no other than Martin Bormann:



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Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Partei-Kanzlei

Der Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei

Führerhauptquartier, 7.Juni 1941

Rundschreiben Nr.70/41

(Nicht zur Veröffentlichung!)

Um das Mitwirkungsrecht der Partei an der Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung des Staates sicherzustellen, hat der Führer den nachfolgenden Erlass vom 29. Mai 1941 herausgegeben: Nach wie vor können selbstverständlich die Stellungnahmen der Partei nur von einer Parteistelle abgegeben werden, denn für die im Einzelfall zuständigen Staatsstellen kann und darf es nur eine verbindliche Parteimeinung geben.

Heil Hitler!

F.d.R.: gez. M. Bormann.

Erlass des Führers
Über die Stellung des Leiters der Partei-Kanzlei
Vom 29. Mai 1941.

Durch Verfügung vom 12. Mai 1941 habe ich für den Bereich der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei angeordnet, dass die bisherige Dienststelle des Stellvertreters des



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Führers von jetzt ab die Bezeichnung Partei-Kanzlei führt und mir persönlich unterstellt ist. Im Anschluss hieran bestimme ich, um die engste Zusammenarbeit der Partei-Kanzlei mit den Obersten Reichsbehörden zu gewährleisten:

Der Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, hat die Befugnisse eines Reichsministers; er gehört als Mitglied der Reichsregierung und dem Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung an.

Wo in Gesetzen, Verordnungen, Erlassen, Verfügungen und sonstigen Anordnungen der "Stellvertreter des Führers" genannt ist, tritt an seine Stelle der Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei.

Die zur Durchführung und Ergänzung dieses Erlasses erforderlichen Vorschriften erlässt der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei im Einvernehmen mit dem Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei.

Führer-Hauptquartier, den 29. Mai 1941

DER FÜHRER
Adolf Hitler

Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei
Dr.Lammers.

“By order of May 12, 1941, I ordered for the area of the National Socialist German Workers' Party that the previous office of the Deputy Führer shall from now on be called the Party Chancellery and shall be subordinate to me personally. In accordance with this, in order to ensure the closest possible cooperation between the Party Chancellery and the Supreme Reich authorities, I hereby order: The head of the Party Chancellery, Reich Leader Martin Bormann, shall have the powers of a Reich Minister; as a member of the Reich Government, he shall be a member of the Reich Government and the Council of Ministers for Reich Defense. Where the "Deputy Führer" is mentioned in laws, regulations, decrees, orders and other instructions, the head of the Party Chancellery shall take his place. The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery shall issue the necessary preliminary measures for the implementation and supplementation of this decree in agreement with the head of the Party Chancellery.” **[26]**

Just as Bormann was called ‘Hitler’s shadow’, he was also called ‘Hitler’s gatekeeper’ for a reason too. Bormann decided who could meet with Hitler. It is noted in his biography that **"Bormann decided almost exclusively who was admitted to Hitler"**. This emphasizes his gatekeeping role and suggests that he had significant influence over who could communicate with the Führer. Bormann was also responsible for announcing Hitler's decisions, which further solidified his position as a critical intermediary between Hitler and other officials in the party **[27]** With Bormann’s tremendous power as Hitler’s private secretary in mind, we should also note what he’s been doing or has done for the NSDAP.

Martin Bormann’s fundraising activities for the NSDAP was very instrumental in making Hitler worry free about financial needs.Hitler did in fact praise Bormann for this. **[28]** Another related deed he did was in regard to management of financial resources. Martin Bormann became the manager and treasurer of the National Socialist motorist corps in 1931. **[29]** The NSDAP relief fund provided financial assistance to the families of injured or deceased party members during the violent struggles for power. This fund also supported the party's overall financing. **[30]** Bormann had also played a role in establishing regulations that governed the party's operations, including handling of church matters and the integration of various organizations under the NSDAP's control, thus strengthening the party's ideological and operational framework. **[31]**

What are the objections to Bormann’s rise to power? Mostly that he would be an opportunist at times to gain more power. Just like how Bormann was quick to succeed Hess, it also appears that Borman took the opportunity to get higher in the ranks when marrying Gerda Buch **[32]** even though it does not seem to be Bormann’s sole purpose, since Bormann definitely saw something in her in their marriage during their private

correspondences. Goebbels provides an interesting insight in his diary. In March 20 of 1941, he wrote:



"Bormann issues a circular to the party in which he defends himself. His position is being attacked strongly from all sides. I don't think he's honest and clear. He got his position more by fraud than by earning it. The party leadership senses this instinctively, hence their rejection. He will have a very hard time if he wants to assert himself. The Führer is already beginning to see through him. Bormann has acted treacherously towards Hess. Hess was short-sighted, but decent. But what can we expect from Bormann?" **[33]**

Indeed, what could Goebbels have expected from Bormann? The answer to this lies in another entry on July 2, 1941, in which Goebbels reports that Martin Bormann had in fact proven himself as worthy of his role even if he got in his way at times: ***"We work well with Bormann. He tackles the party/state problem much more resolutely than Hess ever did. He is also always very loyal to me."*** **[34]** Two years later in 1943 Goebbels gave his final verdict on Martin Bormann:



und vertrauensvoll. Bormann benimmt sich dabei außer-
ordentlich loyal; ich muß schon sagen, daß die Vor-
würfe, die gegen ihn erhoben werden, zum großen Teil
unberechtigt sind. Wenn man gegenüberstellt, was er
von gemachten Versprechungen hält und was Göring
hält, so zieht Göring dabei zweifellos den kürzeren.
Auf Göring ist kein richtiger Verlass mehr. Er ist
müde und etwas verbraucht; jedenfalls kann er in
der Reihe der wirklich ausschlaggebenden Faktoren
nicht mehr ganz sicher eingeschätzt werden.

"Bormann acted exceedingly loyally. I must say that the criticism leveled at him is for the most part unjustified. When you compare what he keeps in the way of promises and what Goering keeps, Goering is undoubtedly at a disadvantage. There is no longer any real dependence on Goering. He is tired and somewhat washed up." **[35]**

Apart from this, Bormann being exceedingly loyal is rather unquestioned even by Hitler, who affirms this throughout many different sources. Hitler's personal photographer Heinrich Hoffmann recalled Hitler saying:

"The fact remains, one after the other, everybody has failed in their implicit obedience to my commands – but Bormann, never!" **[36]**

Likewise with Hitler's secretary, Schroeder recalled Hitler saying: ***"Where others need all day, Bormann does it for me in two hours, and he never forgets anything! . . . Bormann's reports are so precisely formulated that I only need to say Yes or No . With him I get through a pile of files in ten minutes for which other men would need hours. If I tell him, remind me of this or that in six months, I can rest assured***

that he will do so. He is the exact opposite of his brother who forgets every task I give him." **[37]**

Lastly**,** Hitler's Valet Heinz Linge had also attested to Bormann's firmness with Hitler:

"As a result of his constant attendance upon Hitler, Bormann developed a greater insight into Hitler's way of thinking than anybody else. He spared Hitler not only a great deal of work but unburdened him of irritations such as the Gauleiter conferences. [...] Besides Dönitz, Goebbels, Bormann and ourselves, that is to say, his closest circle, Hitler trusted nobody. Everywhere he detected danger and obstruction. As events proved, this fear was not groundless. Even Himmler had negotiated 'with the enemy' against Hitler's wishes, as became clear at the end." **[38]**

As the cherry on top, Martin Bormann had the privilege to sign Hitler's final testament before he took his own life, which would undoubtedly be a way to show Bormann's commitment with Hitler all the way to the end. In the same testament Hitler explicitly mentions Bormann's loyalty. (Bormann's signature is right above Goebbels's signature)


Gegeben zu Berlin, den 29. April 1945, 4.00 Uhr

als Zeugen:

Martin

Dr. Goebbels.

als Zeugen:

Nicolaus von Below.

Onto the last piece of evidence that will be going over is Martin Bormann's private correspondences to his mistress which show his real personality. Having been described as harsh and tough against political rivals, we can see Bormann as a kind and genuine father who really cared for his children and wife. If Bormann was

disingenuous, he would never need to go out of his way to personally hand write his feelings about Hitler and feelings about who he loves. Biographer Volker Koop also notes this in the book on how it shows a vivid picture of Bormann's emotional life and daily work, revealing a different side of him compared to his official correspondence and actions during the Third Reich.

Out of one of many examples, Bormann writes a letter only a day later after the July 20 bomb plot to kill Hitler showing genuine relief that Hitler had not tragically died during the event:



Mein Geliebtes! 21.7.44

Da ich in der vergangenen "Nacht" knapp 1½ Stunde schlief, bin ich zu müd, um Dir zu erzählen!

Wir sind unendlich glücklich, daß der Führer erhalten blieb, seltene Glücks-Umstände ließen die Explosion nicht zu jener Auswirkung kommen, die sie unter anderen Umständen haben müßte!

Aber ich bin, wie erwähnt müd und deshalb begnüge Dich mit den Abschriften der Fernschreiben, die ich herausgab.
Nimm sie danach zu Deinen Akten!

Ich liebe Dich sehr!
und immer mehr!

Herzlichst
Dein
M.

Paß mir gut auf alle Kinder!

"As I had no more than one and a half hours sleep last night, I am too tired to tell you about it. We are infinitely relieved that the Führer has been spared. A rare combination of lucky circumstances prevented the explosion from having the effect it would have had under different conditions. But I'm very tired, as I told you, and so I only send you copies of the circulars I issued by teleprinter. Later put them in your files. I love you very much! I love you more and more! Affectionately Take good care of all the children!" **[39]**

Many other letters demonstrate Bormann's visible distress for Hitler's deteriorating health. Something a traitor would never care about in a private setting.



BLATT 2 ZUM SCHREIBEN VOM 26/12.44 AN

102

Jegelein, der uns rücksichtslos heraus= u. herumtreibt! Seit zwei Tagen haben wir hier ganz klares Wetter – leider – da bei diesem Wetter die Engländer-Amerikaner scharf in den Erdkampf eingreifen, Nachschub bombardieren usw.

Der Führer geht hier jeden Tag ein Stück spazieren u. es tut ihm sichtlich gut. Wenn er mir dies schlimme Zittern nicht hätte, erst war das Bein, jetzt flattern linker Fuß u. linke Hand. Und dabei hängt von seiner Gesundheit Alles ab! Eines ganzen Volkes Zukunft!

Deine Zukunftsschilderungen sind gar nicht so weltfremd, zweifellos müssen wir wichtige

"The Führer takes a short walk each day, and it is obviously doing him a lot of good. I wish he could get rid of these fits of trembling—first it was his leg, and now it has moved to his left arm and hand. And yet, simply everything depends on his health! The future of a whole nation!" **[40]**

A similar example to the previous letter would be a September, 30 1944 letter in which he says again that many things for the German nation depend on the wellbeing of Hitler. Again expressing concern for his health. What's interesting about this specific letter was that Bormann told Gerda to keep it to herself on the news of Hitler's illness. Showing not only the trust that Bormann has on his wife but also the need to speak on things that he would see as endangerment of the German people.



MARTIN BORMANN

MÜNCHEN 33, DEN FÜHRERBAU 30.9.44

so geht wie dem deutschen Volkskörper, der ja auch trotz mancher bereits vorhandener Schäden u. Schmerzen das Äußerste hergeben muß, um standhaft zu bleiben!

Leider gehts - behalts für Dich - dem Führer seit zwei Tagen nicht gut! Er bekam vor Ärger wieder seine Spasmen - unerhört schmerzhafte Magenkrämpfe. Er sagte mir diese Schmerzen seien fast nicht zu ertragen. Nun nahm er wieder entsprechend Ricinus. Öl u. danach in zwei Tagen 6 kl ab! Gut, daß er jetzt stärker war und den Gewichtsverlust leicht ertragen kann. Wie viel hängt von seiner Gesunderhaltung ab!

“Unfortunately—but keep this to yourself—the Führer hasn’t been at all well these last two days. Because of all the worries, he had another attack of his spasms—incredibly painful stomach cramps. All he said was that those pains were almost unbearable. Now he has been taking castor oil again, and lost six pounds within two days. It is just as well that he had put on weight and thus could stand the loss more easily. There is so much that depends on his keeping well! The Führer is still convinced that Morell’s treatment is right, while I would prefer another, more based on biology.” **[41]**

Many other letters demonstrate this well. Other examples are when Bormann told Gerda his plans after he retires, stating his utmost loyalty to serving Hitler: ***“As soon as our Führer no longer needs me, or as soon as there is a new Führer , I shall retire to private life and live—at last—a few years in peace according to my inclinations.”*** **[42]** Then after that he spoke on his devotions as serving his family and his garden. Even in 1945, Bormann was still pledging his loyalty privately, when he stated:


MARTIN BORMANN

MÜNCHEN 33, DEN
FÜHRERBAU

F. H. Qu.
5.1.45.
045

Mein geliebtes Fraüli!
Wir müssen unendlich glücklich
sein, daß wir den Führer haben,
denn zu einem gut Teil beruht
unser unbändiger Glaube auf
einen guten Ausgang dieses Krieges
auf seinem Da-sein! Auf
seiner Genialität u. seinem un-
erschütterlichen Willen!
Und dieser Wille muß wirklich
übermenschlich sein, da unend-
lich viele Dinge ohne ihn nicht nach
Wünsch u. Willen gehen. Des
Führers eigenstes Werk, die
NSDAP, funktioniert,
unsere Luftwaffe — daß Gott
erbarm!
Speer, Saur, Ganzenmüller
raufften sich heute vereint die
Haare!

"My beloved little wife, We must never cease to rejoice that we have our Führer , for our unshakeable faith in ultimate victory is founded in a very large measure on the fact that he exists. On his genius and rock-like determination!" **[43]**

All in all, the evidence from Martin Bormann himself, outside sources, and Hitler too all show that he was an extremely loyal secretary that did his job. Though whether his character is unpleasant is not relevant when it comes to the idea of loyalty, which Bormann was able to demonstrate all the way to his death. His private correspondences would also aid in refuting the spy myth by virtue of being a genuine person. Not one single letter of Bormann exists suggesting any type of betrayal or dislike for Adolf Hitler.

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